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Abstract
I used an auction experiment in China and confirmed that there
is a WTP-WTA gap. I used the solemn oath commitment device and
found that it reduces the gap in the long possession treatment. How-
ever, the gap still exists in the short possession treatment. The evi-
dence suggests that taking an oath to tell the truth with an incentive-
compatible mechanism could mitigate the WTP-WTA gap.
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1 Introduction
The disparity between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept
(WTA) is a controversial topic in economics. The minimum WTA is often
found to be larger than the maximum WTP. When a consumer has a smooth
preference and there is little wealth effect present, WTP and WTA should
theoretically be equivalent (Willig (1976)). However, many empirical studies
have found that there is a large disparity between WTP and WTA standards
(Knetsch and Sinden (1984); Horowitz and McConnell (2002); Tunel and
Hammitt (2014)). Tunel and Hammitt (2014) uses a meta-analysis on WTP
and WTA and finds that the disparity is especially large for public goods and
non-market environmental goods. They also find that disparity decreases
with the participants’ market experiences.
Two main theories could explain the disparity between WTP and WTA.
The first one is the endowment effect, which suggests that people value goods
more when they possess it. This is also called loss aversion, which denotes
that losses are deemed to be more painful than gains. To give up something,
people tend to require more compensation (WTA) than the amount they
would be willing to pay to get it (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). The
endowment effect has been tested and finds supports for this claim(Knetsch
and Sinden (1984);Boyce et al. (1992);Kahneman et al. (1990) ). The other
theory is the substitution effect, which was proposed by Hanemann (1991).
If there are fewer substitutes, people will want to get more compensation to
give up some goods as compared to the amount they are willing to pay for the
goods. This is true for environmental goods, such as clean air and water as
there are few substitutes. Some empirical studies which have utilized candy
bar and sandwich auctions in the lab have found support for this theory
(Shogren et al. (1994);Shogren et al. (2001)). A more comprehensive review
of other possible theories for the disparity between WTP and WTA can be
seen in Marzilli Ericson and Fuster (2014).
A few recent studies have cast doubt on the robustness of the disparity
between WTP and WTA. List (2003) uses a sports card field experiment
and finds that a gap exists among inexperienced traders but not among
dealers. This study argues that the gap can be eliminated through market
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experiences. Plott and Zeiler (2005) argues that the gap is artificial and
is created by the subjects’ misunderstandings of the experiment protocols.
Isoni et al. (2011) repeats Plott and Zeiler (2005)’s experiment and finds
similar results for the mug experiment. However, the gap between WTP and
WTA was still found to exist for the lottery experiment, even after repeated
market transactions. Kszegi and Rabin (2006) proposes an expectation-based
reference point theory, and this theory can explain List (2003)’s findings
well, as dealers do not expect to own sports cards and do not experience
endowment effect. Some studies have also tested Kszegi and Rabin (2006)’s
theory through the use of lab experiments and have found mixed evidence
both for and against it. (Marzilli Ericson and Fuster (2011);Heffetz and List
(2014)).
This paper will thus look towards testing the robustness of the endowment
effect using a commitment device: the solemn oath. The seminar paper by
Jacquemet et al. (2013) uses an oath as a commitment device to elicit the sub-
jects’ preferences. They find it can eliminate the hypothetical bias and also
solve the participation constraint non-binding problem in a real auction. The
effect of the oath has been tested by other researchers with the choice model,
public goods provision, contingent valuation studies, referendum BDM, and
coordination with success(Stevens et al. (2013); De Magistris et al. (2016);
de Magistris and Pascucci (2014); Jacquemet et al. (2017);Carlsson et al.
(2013);Jacquemet et al. (2015)). de Magistris and Pascucci (2014) uses a hy-
pothetical choice experiment for a private good and finds that the oath can
reduce the participants’ WTP. Stevens et al. (2013) uses a referendum for
public goods contribution under a BDM mechanism and finds that the oath
successfully reduces hypothetical bias. Jacquemet et al. (2017) also confirm
the effect of the oath in eliminating any hypothetical bias under a referen-
dum. In addition, Jacquemet et al. (2015) finds that the oath can solve any
coordination problems in a game. Some researchers have studied the oath in
field studies beyond the lab and find that the effect of the oath is related to
culture and socioeconomic characteristics. Carlsson et al. (2013) has studied
the effect of oath with a CVM study in both China and Sweden. They find
that the oath reduces subjects’ WTP for climate change mitigation in China
but increases the subjects’ WTP in Sweden. De Magistris et al. (2016) find
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the effect of the oath is also related to the participants’ socio-demographic
characteristics, such as education and income.
Previous literature, such as Plott and Zeiler (2005), argue that the pref-
erence elicitation format can be the source of the disparity between WTP
and WTA. Many previous studies regarding the WTP and WTA gap use
a hypothetical survey (Kahneman et al. (1990), while other studies use an
incentive-compatible mechanism, such as BDM. However, Cason and Plott
(2014) has shown that misperception of the experiment can lead to biased
results. They find the BDM mechanism of eliciting preferences is not reliable,
as subjects can mistake the second price auction incentives of the BDM for
the first-price auction. They argue the disparity of WTP and WTA can come
from the misconception of the form of the game rather than their preference.
More training and experience with the game would thus help reduce the gap
(Plott and Zeiler (2005); Engelmann and Hollard (2010)).
I use the oath device to test if it can eliminate the WTP and WTA gap.
The oath can increase the subjects’ cognitive efforts and help avoid the mis-
conception of the game form. In addition, I have two training rounds to
allow subjects to understand the incentive-compatibility of the BDM. The
real bidding is sectioned into four rounds to give the subjects more experi-
ences. In addition, I follow Plott and Zeiler (2005)’s instructions to avoid
giving the subjects any misconceptions with regards to the instructions.
I also vary the experiment design by changing the reference state. In two
groups, subjects are allowed to keep the endowment during the experiment.
In the other two groups, subjects do not possess the endowment at the time of
the decision. This difference creates a strong reference state and a weak ref-
erence state, respectively. Knetsch and Wong (2009) create weak and strong
reference states through manipulation of ownership, physical possession, and
wording of the trade. They find that physical possession in combination with
wordings, such as “give up” or “keep” create the strongest endowment effect.
However, the ownership at the time of decision does not affect the endowment
effect. In total, 158 students participated in the experiment. Among them,
100 participants were male and 54 were female. 4 participants did not fill
out the questionnaire about socio-economic characteristics and consequently,
I do not have any information about their gender.
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My results show there is a significant gap between WTP and WTA among
the four groups, except one. Taking an oath eliminates the gap in the
long possession group, while the oath does not eliminate the gap in the no-
possession group. I find the no-possession group has a stronger endowment
effect than the long possession group. The result is different from Knetsch
and Wong (2009). As such, the findings can contribute to the literature on
the robustness of the WTP-WTA gap.
2 Experiment Design
The experiment was carried out at Xi’an Jiaotong University, China. I place
a bulletin board on campus to recruit participants. The baseline is a long
possession without the oath. The other three treatments are long possession
with an oath, short possession without an oath, and short possession with
an oath. The experiment design is in table 1. Plott and Zeiler (2005) argues
that the misconception of the experimental procedure can lead to the WTP-
WTA gap. It is thus essential to follow the best practice to address these
potential misconceptions. I followed Plott and Zeiler (2005)’s procedure and
used the following procedures to ensure that there was no misconception of
the game: 1) randomization for the buyer and seller of the candy bar; 2) using
incentive-compatible mechanism BDM to elicit the subjects’ preferences; 3)
explanation of the optimal response with numerical values; 4) using a market
environment with some incentives; 5) measuring the gap directly by using
valuations; 6) providing practice rounds.
After subjects enter the classroom, I randomly divided them into two
groups of buyers and sellers, according to the odd and even last digit of each
subject’s student id number. Each subject is asked to choose a desk with
instructions on it. They are then asked to sign the consent form. I collect
all the forms once they finish. An experimenter reads the instruction aloud
so everybody can follow it. Subjects are also welcome to ask questions and
are informed that the experimenter will answer their questions. An induced
value experiment with two rounds is used to help subjects understand the
incentive-compatibility of the BDM mechanism. Subjects are explicitly told
that the dominant strategy is to bid truthfully and strategic behavior would
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not be in their best interests. After the training, subjects participate in the
real experiment. Sellers of candy bars are asked to state their minimum
WTA to sell the candy bars and buyers are asked to state their maximum
WTP to buy the candy bars. There are four rounds. After each round, a
random number that is between 1 to 15 is drawn and the market price is
determined. Sellers whose WTA is lower than this price have to sell candy
bars at this price. Buyers whose WTP is larger than this price have to
pay this amount to buy candy bars. After four rounds, a random number
between 1 to 4 is drawn to determine which round is binding. Socioeconomic
data was then collected after the experiment. Subjects receive 30 Yuan as
the participation fee. An on-campus job in Xi’an is usually paid 8 Yuan
/hour. If they sell the candy bar as sellers, their earnings would be equal
to the participation fee plus the market price. If they buy the candy bar
as buyers, their earnings equal the participation fee minus the market price.
Subjects are paid through electronic transfer to their bank accounts after the
completion of the experiment.
The subjects with oath treatments are the same as those without oath
treatment, with the exception of the subjects being asked to sign an oath
script before the commencement of the experiment. The oath script is pre-
sented in Figure 1. In the possession treatments, subjects are allowed to keep
the candy bar during the experiment. However, in the without-possession
treatment, subjects do not physically possess the candy bar at the time of
decision. At the beginning of the experiment, a few candy bars are passed
around for subjects to inspect before the candy bars are collected again. As
such, the subjects do not physically possess the candy bar at the time of
decision. In all treatments, the sellers own the candy bar.
3 Data and Results
3.1 Summary Statistics
In the baseline group, the average WTP and WTA are 6.13 Yuan and 7.4
Yuan, respectively. In the short treatment without oath, long treatment with
an oath, and short treatment with an oath, the average WTP is 5.9, 5.3, 5.5
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Table 1: Experiment Design
Practice
rounds
Commitment Elicitation
Mechanism
Number
of rounds
Payment
Baseline-
long without oath
2 BDM 4 random round
Short without oath 2 BDM 4 random round
Long with oath 2 X BDM 4 random round
Short with oath 2 X BDM 4 random round
Figure 1: oath script
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Yuan, respectively; and the average WTA is 7.8, 6.4, 8.25 Yuan, respectively.
The summary statistics are in table 2.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Baseline non-possession without oath possession with oath non-possession with Oath
wtp wta wtp wta wtp wta wtp wta
Mean 6.14 7.40 5.93 7.80 5.30 6.41 5.48 8.25
Median 5.75 7.75 5.75 8.00 4.50 7.00 5.75 9.00
Standard Deviation 2.05 2.51 2.25 2.07 2.16 3.00 1.34 3.03
n 31 23 22 15 15 17 15 20
3.2 Results
Result 1 There is a disparity between WTA and WTP, and WTA is signif-
icantly greater than WTP.
Support. From table 2 we see WTA is larger than WTP in each treat-
ment. From Figure 1-4, we can see in each treatment that the WTA dis-
tribution strictly dominates the WTP distribution. The Wilcoxon rank-
sum test rejects the null hypothesis that WTP and WTA are drawn from
the same population in both the baseline and short-without oath treatment
(z = 1.936, p = 0.0529, and z = 2.419, p = 0.0156, respectively). The
median test also rejects the null hypothesis that the medians are drawn
from two populations that have identical medians for the baseline (Pearson
χ2 = 5.9425, p = 0.015). However, it fails to reject the null for the short
treatment without an oath (Pearson χ2 = 1.1675, p = 0.280).
Result 2. With a solemn oath, the disparity between WTP and WTA in the
long possession group disappears. However, it persists in the short possession
group.
Support. In the long with oath treatment, I find that the gap between WTP
and WTA is statistically insignificant. Using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
I fail to reject the null hypothesis that WTP and WTA are drawn from an
identical population (z = 1.211, p = 0.226). The median test fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the two independent samples are drawn from pop-
ulations with the same medians (χ2 = 0.000, p = 1.000). In the short-with
oath treatment, I find that the gap between WTP and WTA is significant.
8
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the null hypothesis that the WTP and
WTA are drawn from the identical population (z = 3.154, p = 0.002). The
median test rejects the null hypothesis that the two independent samples are
drawn from populations with the same medians (χ2 = 6.6936, p = 0.010).
Result 3. The short possession endowment increases the disparity between
the WTP and WTA.
Support. I calculate the gap in each round by using the average WTA minus
the average WTP. In the baseline, the gaps in the four rounds are {1.228,
1.228, 1.228, 1.088}. The gaps in the four rounds of short- without oath
treatment are {2.142, 1.996, 1.372, 1.960}. The gaps in the long-with oath
treatment are {1.282, 1.270, 0.909, 0.984}. The gaps in the short-with oath
treatment are {2.583, 2.65, 2.883, 2.95}. I pool the two treatments with
short possession and the two treatments with the long possession. Using
the Wilcoxon signed rank test, I reject the null hypothesis that the two
independent samples are drawn from identical populations (z = −2.380, p =
0.0173).
I also use individual round data and find the same results. The subjects’
bids are relatively stable across four rounds.
Table 3: Statistical test results
Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney rank sum test
(Null hypothesis: identical distribution)
Median test
(Null hypothesis: populations have identical medi-
ans)
z p-value Conclusion (α = 0.05) Pearson χ2 p-value conclusion (α = 0.05)
Baseline-
long without oath
1.936 0.0529 fail to reject null 5.9425 0.015 reject null
Short without oath 2.419 0.0156 reject null 1.1675 0.28 fail to reject null
Long with oath 1.211 0.226 fail to reject null 0 1 fail to reject null
Short with oath 3.154 0.002 reject null 6.6936 0.01 reject null
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Figure 2: Empirical Distribution Functions of bids: treat1–baseline; treat2–
short without oath; treat3–long with oath; treat4–short with oath
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Recent studies have cast doubt on the robustness of the disparity between
WTP and WTA. They argue the gap can stem from subjects’ misconceptions
of the game (Plott and Zeiler (2005);Cason and Plott (2014)). I follow the
modified experimental procedures and found that there is a significant gap.
In addition, I use the commitment device: a solemn oath, to increase the
subjects’ cognitive efforts towards telling the truth. The oath script works
to reduce the gap in the long possession group. However, the gap still exists
in the non-possession group. I also find the non-possession group has a sig-
nificantly larger gap than the possession group. My evidence suggests that
the physical possession of the good does not increase the subjects’ valuation
of the good. This lends support to Kszegi and Rabin (2006)’ expectation-
based endowment effect. Most of the tests on the disparity between WTP
and WTA are conducted in the U.S. and other industrialized countries. Evi-
dence suggests that subjects may behave differently across different cultures.
In addition, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that subjects in China and Sweden
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respond differently to a solemn oath in a CVM study. Ehmke et al. (2008)
tests the hypothetical bias in different continents and finds that there are
differences across cultures. As such, many other experimental studies use a
broader subject pool to study the universal effect of behavioral bias (Henrich
et al. (2001)). Apicella et al. (2014) studies isolated hunter-gathers group
living in Northern Tanzania and found they do not show the endowment ef-
fect. The same population living in areas that are more exposed to modern
society do not show the endowment effect. My evidence in China thus lends
support to the universal effect of the endowment effect.
My study has some limitations. For one, I had a relatively small sam-
ple size. I also used student subjects in the lab to increase the control of
the experiment. An avenue for future research can be in the study of the
endowment effect in a field setting that has a more diversified subject pool.
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